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Financialization as a Strategy of Workplace Control in Professional Service 
Firms 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Recently, there has been an increased focus on finance as a form of control in 
corporations. In this paper, we explore financialization as an employee control 
strategy in a Big Four accountancy firm, and more specifically how it affects the 
everyday lives of the professionals within the firm. We found financialization 
involved attempts to transform employees working lives into an investment 
activity where work wDVH[SHULHQFHGDV µELOODEOHKRXUV¶ WKDWDUH µLQYHVWHG¶ LQ WKH
hope of a high future pay-off. Employees sought to increase the value of their 
investment by skilful manipulation. If wisely managed, this investment could yield 
significant benefits in the future. We argue that financialization involves active 
employee participation and is a way of binding other forms of control together. 
 
 
Key words: Professional Control; Financialization; Performance Management; 
Professional Service Firm. 
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1. Introduction 
 
According to some commentators, we have now entered an age of 
financialization (e.g. Martin, 2002; Erturk et al, 2008; Davis, 2009). Despite some 
concerns about the fuzziness of the concept (Engelen, 2008), researchers have 
noted the increasing importance of speculative financial instruments in the 
shaping of the economy (e.g. Boyer, 2000; Froud et al, 2001; Krippner, 2005; 
Palley, 2007), and financial aspects have become central to the management 
and control of corporations (e.g. Aglietta & Breton, 2001; Roberts et al, 2006; 
Froud et al, 2006). Anglo-Saxon corporations are now often run by CEOs from 
financial or legal backgrounds (Fligstein, 1990), and financial groups seek to 
extend their control over large corporations (Davis & Thompson, 1994). 
Shareholder value has become a dominant logic within some firms (Froud et al, 
2000; Fiss & Zajac, 2004) and senior managers have become increasingly 
responsive to financial agents such as fund managers (Roberts et al, 2006). 
Various aspects of organizational life are now dominated by financial 
technologies (Ezzamel et al, 2008) and the result is that while in past, 
corporations may have been controlled by management and managerial 
knowledge (Grey, 1999), today they are controlled by financiers and financial 
knowledge (Davis, 2009).  
 
Professional service firms such as lawyers, consultants and accountants (Froud 
et al, 2006; Carter & Mueller, 2006; Quack, 2007) play an important role in the 
process of financialization (Folkman et al, 2007). While we know that 
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professional service firms (PSFs) have been an important agent of the 
financialization process, we know less about whether these PSFs are themselves 
the target of financialized forms of control. Recent work on law firms suggests 
many forms of financial control in largH FRUSRUDWLRQV VXFK DV µHFRQRPLF YDOXH
DGGHG¶ RU µSURILW SHU HTXLW\ SDUWQHU¶ PHDVXUHV KDYH EHFRPH FRPPRQ
(Faulconbridge & Muzio, 2009). This has driven extensive restructuring of 
employment, and has become the core indicator of firm success. However, what 
remains to be seen is how these forms of financialized controls affect the control 
RISURIHVVLRQDOV¶ZRUN7RDGGUHVVWKLVJDSZHZRXOGOLNHWRDVNhow financialized 
forms of controls have been applied to employees in professional service firms. 
 
In order to explore this question, we have decided to examine systems of control 
in one PSF. Existing studies have identified various control strategies mobilized 
by PSFs including recruitment, human resource management, management by 
objectives, career systems and client control. All these were present in the 
organization which we studied. However, we also noticed that in our case, these 
control strategies were bound together by the drive to financialize employees¶ 
working lives. Broadly this involves attempts to transform the professional service 
HPSOR\HHV LQWR µLQYHVWRUVXEMHFWV¶ .QLJKWV/DQJOH\ZKRVH
working lives are increasingly disciplined by financialized technologies, mirroring 
the processes apparent in market transactions (Barley & Kunda, 2004). These 
technologies gave their working lives monetary value that could be invested, 
traded, speculated and leveraged. It occured through employees seeking to 
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transform activities in the workplace into billable hours. Moreover, we noticed that 
employees would put significant effort into manipulating the system in a way that 
PDGHWKHLUDFWLYLWLHVµELOODEOH¶7KHELOODEOHKRXUVZHUHVXEVHTXHQWO\µLQYHVWHG¶E\
employees with the expectation that they would render future returns. The value 
RI WKLV µLQYHVWPHQW¶ ZDV PDQLSXODWHG WKURXJK YDULRXV IRUPDO SHUIRUPDQFH
PDQDJHPHQW WHFKQLTXHV WKDW VRXJKW WR SXW D SULFH RQ SHUIRUPDQFH DQG µVRIW¶
skills. Finally, we found that the commodity of billable hours was traded through 
employees seeking to off-load less profitable billable hours and invest (albeit 
briefly) in more profitable ones. By doing this, they hoped to increase their stock 
of capital (billable hours) with the intention they could eventually convert this into 
SDUWQHUVKLS7KLVUHVXOWHGLQDµILQDQFLDOL]DWLRQ¶RIFRQWUROZKHUHE\HYHU\GD\ZRUN
became understood as a kind of investment that should be wisely manipulated so 
the employee could later reap the benefits. Not only did this profoundly impact 
how employees experienced their working lives, it also had an impact on their 
behaviours. In particular, it transformed how they used their time and changed 
the kinds of projects they pursued.  
 
By attending to financialization as a control strategy in PSFs we seek to make 
three contributions. First, we extend the literature on control in PSFs (e.g. 
Covaleski et al, 1998; Morris & Pinnington, 1998; Anderson-Gough et al, 2000; 
Alvesson, 2004). In particular, we argue that financialization is an important but 
under-recognised form of control in PSFs (see also Faulconbridge & Muzio, 
2009). Secondly, we extend the growing literature on financialization of corporate 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
control (e.g. Fligstein, 1990; Froud et al, 2006; Davis, 2009). We do this by 
pointing out that this involves not only shifts in who controls firms and the rise of 
financial monitoring technologies, but it also shifts in how employees are 
controlled in the workplace in their everyday activities. In particular, we show that 
financialization comes to infiltrate the life-world and activities of employees, 
makLQJ WKHP LQWR µLQYHVWRU VXEMHFWV¶ 0DUWLQ  (UWXUN HW DO  7KLV
means that they experience their own work and behaviour as kinds of capital that 
need to be wisely invested and traded in order to ensure a good return. Finally, 
we make a contribution to recent studies of the disciplinary affect of 
financialization processes (e.g. Knights, 1997; Roberts et al, 2006; Langley, 
2007, 2008). We argue that financialization works as a disciplinary micro-control 
strategy where people actively use, mobilize and invest in their career. It is 
something that actually encourages active game playing, intervention and 
entrepreneurial manipulation. While existing studies have tended to focus on the 
sphere of consumption (e.g. Langley, 2008) or corporation-investor interaction 
(e.g. Roberts et al, 2006), we extend these insights to the workplace, and more 
particularly the control of professional service workers. This shows how such 
financialized modes of control can operate in the contexts of some of the more 
minute aspects of everyday workplace interaction. 
  
In order to make these contributions, we proceed as follows. We begin by 
reviewing existing studies of workplace control in PSFs. We identify an important 
aspect of control that has not been sufficiently explored ± namely the logic of 
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FDUHHURIµLQYHVWLQJ¶ in oneself (Grey, 1994). We ask how this form of control has 
played out in PSFs. We then outline our methods, followed by our findings. We 
draw out three processes associated with financialized control in the workplace: 
valuation, manipulation and arbitrage. We argue that each of these processes 
lead to a financialization of workplace control. We conclude by drawing out the 
contributions of the present study, the limitations and some lines for future 
research.     
 
2. Control of Professionals  
 
In order to explore financialization as a form of employee control in PSFs, we will 
begin by placing it into the context of other workplace control mechanisms. 
Existing research has identified a range of sources of employee control in PSFs. 
Firms can control through recruiting employees who have appropriate norms, 
values and dispositions inculcated through education, family background and 
early life experiences (Hanlon, 1996). The recruitment process itself makes 
neophyte professionals feel they are part of an elite and thus increase their 
commitment to the firm (Alvesson & Robertson, 2006). Once individuals join the 
firm, Human Resource Management systems become an important conduit of 
control (e.g. Aharoni, 1999; Maister, 1993). Rhetoric in PSFs typically 
HPSKDVL]HV µVRIW¶ +50 V\VWHPV EDVHG RQ FRPPLWPHQW VNLOO DQG FXOWXUDO
RULHQWDWLRQ ,Q UHDOLW\ WKHVH µVRIW¶PRGHOV DSSHDU VLGH E\ VLGH ZLWK µKDUG¶ +50
systems that treat employees as a factor of production (Legge, 1995: 67). 
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Management by objectives is also a typical control strategy, ostensibly providing 
clear performance criteria and objective evaluations of these (Covaleski et al, 
2QHRIWKHPRVWSRWHQWIRUPVRIFRQWURO LQ36)VLVWKHµXSRURXW¶FDUHHU
system. The core characteristic of this system is that an employee is only allowed 
WRVWD\DWDFHUWDLQ OHYHO IRUDFHUWDLQ WLPHDIWHUZKLFK LW LV µXSRURXW¶$WHDFK
higher level, fewer places are available, and when at the top, one needs to fight 
for one's existence by broadening the market or out-manoeuvring others (Baden-
Fuller & Bateson, 1990; Morris & Pinnington, 1998; Sherer, 1995). The result is 
that employees must show significant commitment if they are to make a career 
within the firm. In addition to these control systems within the firm, clients can act 
as an important form of control. This happens when employees in PSFs are 
pushed to put on professional displays to the client that model rationality and 
client-centeredness (Clark, 1985; Power, 1997; Werr et al, 1997; Anderson-
*RXJK HW DO  6XFK VWURQJ LGHQWLILFDWLRQ ZLWK FOLHQWV DQG GHPDQG WR µEH
SURIHVVLRQDO¶RIWHQPHDQV WKDWHPSOR\HHVQHHG WR ORRN OLNH WKHLUFOLHQWV:KLWH
male, middle class heterosexual is the norm, and any deviation from this has to 
be carefully managed (Grey, 1994,1998; Haynes, 2008).  
 
Recruitment, human resource management, management by objectives, career 
systems and client control are all well-known forms of control. Recently, a 
number of commentators have pointed to the increasing importance of another 
particularly powerful form of control in PSFs ± financial technologies (e.g. 
Faulconbridge & Muzio, 2009). These can come in range of forms from the 
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demands of various financial intermediaries such as fund managers (Roberts et 
al, 2006), to complex technologies that compose and track the financial 
performance of firms against certain metrics (e.g. Froud et al, 2000), to far more 
subtle forms of self regulation where people begin to think of themselves and 
their various projects in financial terms (e.g. Martin, 2002). We might expect that 
the partnership-based ownership structure of many PSFs might make them fairly 
immune to the increasing influence of financial markets. However, this does not 
seem to be the case. For instance, some have argued that the far-reaching 
restructuring of law firms has been driven by the increasing obsession with 
various forms of corporate control (Faulconbridge & Muzio, 2009). Others have 
noted in passing that professional service employees experience their 
profesVLRQDOFDUHHUVDVDSURFHVVRIµinvesting¶ in themselves (Grey, 1994). This 
appears to tap into what other commentators have noted is the process whereby 
financialized forms of control instil a sense of self-discipline into subjects (e.g. 
Knights, 1997; Aitken, 2007; Langley, 2007, 2008). We want to explore how this 
process of self-disciplining financialization plays out as a form of control in the 
context of PSFs.  
 
3. The Study 
 
3.1 Setting 
In order to explore financialization in a PSF, we will focus on the results of a 
study of the Swedish part of a Big Four auditing firm. While the process of 
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financialization is usually identified as originating in the US (Montgomerie, 2008) 
the impact is present on a global basis. Changes in ideologies and institutions of 
corporate control, changing financial technologies as well as mass savings 
SURYLGHDFRQWH[WZKLFKLQFUHDVHGHPDQGVRQYDULRXVDFWRUVWRDFWDVµLQYHVWRUV¶
(Fligstein, 1990; French & Kneale, 2009; Langley, 2007; MacKenzie, 2006). 
Sweden is a particularly interesting case, since whilst neoliberal pension reforms 
in the µ90s fuelled mass savings, and with this supported the dissemination of the 
discourse of financialization, in general there seems to exist a significant 
resistance and that µILQDQFLDOLVDWLRQODFNVOHJLWLPDF\LQ6ZHGHQ¶%HOIUDJH
278). Thus, the context can be seen as presenting a particularly unlikely 
environment to find financialized control. 
 
Specifically, the department for tax consulting (referred to as DM&I) is our focus. 
Tax specialists are interesting because they have played an important role in the 
process of financialization. They did this through helping large corporations to 
minimize their tax burden (Sikka, 2009; Sikka & Willmott, 2010). Perhaps more 
importantly, tax consultants have leveraged their position as knowledge brokers 
between national tax collectors and corporate clients (Hasseldine et al, 2011). 
The tax department is a specialty within the firm, sometimes working as back 
office support to the accountants but also with their own clients. The work largely 
concerns the structuring of various transactions in order to obtain tax 
advantages. The tax consultants, almost exclusively with a law background, pride 
WKHPVHOYHVRQEHLQJDEOHWRSURYLGHµVDIH¶VROXWLRQVZKLFKPHDQVVROXWLRQVWKDW
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will hold up in court. In fact, this sometimes requires them to hold clients back 
from being too opportunistic in their behaviour. Furthermore, they see it as 
important to take the whole business situation of the client into consideration 
when giving advice. 
 
Two years prior to the study, there was a change of management in the firm. 
While the change process itself is not in focus in this paper, it provides an 
important background for the case. Before the change, the firm was very similar 
to the professional partnership (or P2) archetype as described by Greenwood et 
al (1990). The structure was simple and informal. One partner nostalgically 
described it as a situation where you had very few formal requirements and a 
wide scope of possibilities. The subsequent development at DM&I mirrors the 
findings of other studies which note how PSFs have moved towards more formal 
forms of control and greater structural complexity (cf. Hinings et al, 1999). 
 
The most notable control technology involves the importance of registering 
billable hours. This will be developed in more detail later; of importance here is to 
note that formerly, the time spent on specific jobs were estimated before sending 
the bill to the client, and the consultants kept informal notes on the time spent on 
various jobs. With the management change, there was an increased emphasis 
on the systematic registration of billable hours. A web-based reporting system 
was put to use where the consultants submitted their time-use on a weekly basis. 
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The purpose of this was to increase the precision of the time reporting and also 
to make it easier for the consultants to submit their reports. 
 
Another important aspect is the HRM system. Formerly, personnel development 
was up to the individual and her or his ability to create productive mentorship 
relations. The HRM system is supposed to formalize this and ensure that each 
and every one gets the support s/he needs. The HRM system also seeks to 
systematize and homogenize the development process. A set of dimensions has 
been defined, through which the individual is supposed to develop in order to 
become a more productive consultant. Dimensions include communications 
skills, leadership skills, knowledge development and business acumen. A number 
of HR professionals have been hired in order to develop and formalize everything 
from recruitment via performance appraisals to exit management for those who 
leave the firm. The focus on HR has also materialized in things such as free gym 
cards, increased support for parental leave, and the possibility to get partial 
funding for a maid to take care of household chores. The discourse about the 
HRM system within the firm heavily emphasised the strategic importance of it. 
The aim is that it will help the organization achieve its goal of becoming 
perceived as the best employer in the business, thereby increasing the supply of 
competent people. The tax consultants themselves are less enthusiastic. While 
most recognize the positive intentions, they also find it less important. As one 
laconically remarked when talking about perfRUPDQFHDSSUDLVDO³:KHQ\RXJHW
RXWRIWKHURRP>IURPWKHDSSUDLVDO@WKHUH¶VVRPXFKUHDOLW\WKDW\RXGRQ¶WGR
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WKRVHWKLQJVDQ\ZD\´'HVSLWHWKHF\QLFLVPWRZDUGVWKHVHV\VWHPVWKH
importance of billable hours and shifts in the HRM systems makes this an ideal 
case to explore how the dynamics of financialization and self-disciplining play 
out. 
 
 
3.2 Methodology  
The study is based on a broad methodological approach, drawing inspiration 
from ethnographic case study approaches (e.g. Rosen, 1985; Stake, 2000). The 
study took place during 2001±2003. During three phases of field work 42 semi-
structured interviews were conducted with employees at all levels (See Table 1). 
Two of these interviews were conducted with former employees. Interviews 
lasted between 1 and 2 hours. All interviews have been transcribed verbatim and 
translated from Swedish. Initially, interviewees were asked to talk about their 
broader work situation (e.g. 'Tell me about your job'). The researcher then wrote 
down the topics that the respondent raised, using them as a starting point for 
follow-up questions. As the study developed, certain themes became more 
prominent, DVWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHHPSLULFDOFRQWH[WGHYHORSHG
These helped to narrow the agenda of research questions that were asked. The 
three major offices in Sweden were visited. Also, informal observations of 
PHHWLQJV SDUWLFLSDWLQJ LQ DQG REVHUYLQJ D&KULVWPDV SDUW\ DQG VRPH µKDQJLQJ
DURXQGDQGDVNLQJTXHVWLRQV¶ 'LQJZDOO ZHUH GRQH)LQDOO\ LQWHUQDODQG
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official documentation (such as HRM documentation and employment policies) 
were obtained and included in the analysis. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
As the research project progressed, the theme of billable hours emerged as 
important. When interviewed about the HRM system and performance reviews 
for instance, respondents constantly bought up the issue of billable hours. Also, 
in one of the offices a list with the latest billable hours report, allegedly for the 
RIILFHPDQDJHU¶V H\HVRQO\ZDVSXEOLFO\ GLVSOD\HGDW WKH WDEOH LQ WKH FRPPRQ
room. Finally, we noticed that junior and senior employees related differently to 
billable hours, indicating that the system itself was maybe part of the socialization 
process for the professionals. All these indications led to a closer focus on the 
issue, in particular we sought to investigate the design of the system and 
examined how employees related to it.  
 
Once we had collected the material, we then looked through all the data again for 
material related to the theme of billable hours and other forms of control. Through 
successive iterations between theoretical material on financialization and control 
in PSFs and the data, we identified three central issues which were raised: the 
transformation of time into money through the technology of billable hours, the 
attempt to accumulate these billable hours by employees in order to progress 
through the organization, and the various techniques which were used in order to 
accumulate these billable hours. Once we had identified each of these issues, we 
explored in more depth how each of these processes worked. This involved three 
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aspects: Describing how processes actually worked; identifying the various 
technologies which were involved; examining how employees responded and 
how it impacted on their work lives. Once we did this, we were able to construct 
an account of how each of the elements of financialization worked.  
 
4. Findings 
 
4.1 Time is money 
 
As in PSFs in general (Kärreman & Alvesson, 2004), several forms of control 
appear simultaneously at DM&I. There are mentoring programs, direct 
supervision, performance appraisals, and a formal hierarchy consisting of 
Assistants, Consultants, Managers, Senior Managers and Partners. Moreover, 
the DM&I staff deem clients important. But the most apparent form of control is 
billable hours (Brown & Lewis, 2011). We will return to the informal reasons for 
this later, but there is also a clear official emphasis on this. In the words of a 
partner working with HR: 
 
Put harshly, what we make a living of is billing for our work. And work in 
consultancy is normally related to time, so to speak. That means that the 
utilization totally determines the survival of the firm. 
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µ8WLOL]DWLRQ¶PHDQVWKHQXPEHURIELOODEOHKRXUVGLYLGHGE\IXOOZRUN-time working 
hours, normally this is expected to be above 75 %. The accumulation of billable 
hours is thought to operate like clockwork. Every hour worked gets reported into 
the web-based accounting system and is assigned to a specific client project, all 
on an individual self-reporting basis. Thus, one hour registered is supposed to 
HTXDORQHKRXUZRUNHG,QWKHFOLHQWV¶YLHZWKHUROHRIELOODEOHKRXUVLVLPSRUWDQW
in that it seems to be the basis for the total sum charged for a project or task. 
This is not correct however, since the bill is almost always a post facto 
construction. Sometimes the amount of time spent on a specific job is less than 
what can be charged to the client, and sometimes all the time spent cannot be 
charged. Thus, there is no clear-cut relation between how much time is spent on 
the job and how much WKHFOLHQWLVELOOHGHYHQWKRXJKWKHFOLHQW¶VELOOLVZULWWHQLQ
terms of hours spent. The client is billed in accordance to how much the job is 
worth to the client and how price sensitive the client is.  
 
In practice, registering billable hours is more difficult. For one thing, the auditors 
PXVWGHFLGHXSRQZKDWFRXQWVDVYDOXDEOHZRUN2QH3DUWQHU WROGXV µ<RXDUH
supposed to debit all time spent on a task . . . but at the same time, it may be that 
you head off in the totally wrong direction . . . there are always situations where I 
FDQ¶W ELOOPLOOLRQV RI KRXUV IRU VRPHWKLQJ , FDQQRW FKDUJH IRU¶0RUHRYHU DV DQ
$VVLVWDQW UHPDUNHG µ\RX IHHO E\ \RXUVHOI KRZHIIHFWLYH \RX¶YHEHHQ¶7KXV IRU
the person reporting their billable hours, a form of self-monitoring is always 
apparent. Was I good enough? Will the client be willing to pay for this? Did I 
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deliver good enough quality? The effect of this is that the professional often 
devalues some of their work by not billing. Reporting billable hours is a question 
of self-valuation and judgement.  
 
The ever-presence of billable hours is obvious. Working at DM&I often means 
WKDWVHYHUDOLVVXHVDUHRQRQH¶VGHVNDWWKHVDPHWLPHZKLOHLQFRPLQJFDOOVDQG
emails from clients or peers disrupt the workflow. In order to keep track of time, 
several tactics are employed. Some use paper sheets with six-minute slots, 
continually recording what they do, while others use spreadsheets on their 
computers. A Consultant explains the way of managing this: 
 
If I have a five-minute telephone conversation with a client, as a beginner I 
UHFRUGHGILYHPLQXWHVµRNILYHPLQXWHVWHOHSKRQHFDOO¶EXWLIVR,IRUJHWWR
record the two minutes it takes to bring out my time report, they should go 
in there too, and I forget the ten minutes it takes to open an account if the 
FOLHQWLVQ¶WDOUHDG\WKHUHDQG,IRUJHWWKHWHQPLQXWHVLWWDNHVWR,I,KDYH
given advice I have to take notes on it, for someone else to review and 
also charge time for. So, often, tasks are more complex, and in the 
beginning you tend to forget to enter all time. 
 
One common strategy to manage this extra time which cannot easily be allocated 
to individual clients is to spread them over all projects at the end of the day in 
RUGHU WR QRW µORVH¶ WLPH +HUH D SRVVLELOLW\ RI Panipulating the system arises, 
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VLQFH LIRQH LV IRUWXQDWHHQRXJK WRKDYHFOLHQWV WKDWDUH µELOOLQJ-LQVHQVLWLYH¶ WKH
opportunities for adding some extra time on their report arises; this is called 
µRYHU-ELOOLQJ¶DQGLVSRVVLEOHEXWWKHIUHTXHQF\E\ZKLFKLt occurs varies between 
hierarchical levels. 
 
All this self-monitoring is not something that disappears into an automatic routine. 
An Assistant comments WKDW µ\RXNHHSDQH\HRQ WKHZDWFKDOO WKH WLPH¶DQGD
&RQVXOWDQWQRWHV WKDW µDOOP\WLPH LVGHYRWHGWR thinking in six-PLQXWH LQWHUYDOV¶
Meetings that cannot be charged to a specific project are experienced as 
IUXVWUDWLQJDQGFRUULGRU WDON LVNHSW WRDPLQLPXP$W WKHFRIIHHPDFKLQH WKHUH¶V
talk while you wash your cup and refill, then you rapidly return to work. The quiet 
atmosphere of all the offices visited was striking.  
 
From these observations, it is quite clear that billable time is not as neutral as it 
may appear. It enters into everyday practice of the professionals and as a form of 
control. It also appears quite short sighted, as it always focuses employees on 
WKHµQRZ¶0DQ\H[SUHVVWKHRSLQLRQWKDWWKHUHLVDODFNRIREMHFWLYHVDQGYLVLRQV
DQGWKDWELOODEOHWLPHLVDOOWKDWFRXQWV$&RQVXOWDQWVDLGWKDWµWKHQH[WZHHNZH
NQRZDERXWEHFDXVHWKDW¶VDOZD\VDERXWRSWLPL]LQJELOODEOHWLPH>«@WKHUHVWLV
sort of out in WKHEOXHVRPHZKHUH¶ 
 
The dominance of billable hours has a number of effects. Perhaps the most 
obvious result is that the chaotic flow of the working day is transformed into 
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something quantifiable. By pushing employees to record their time, they are 
askHGWRDSSO\WKHSUHFLVHO\TXDQWLILDEOHµFORFNWLPH¶RIWKHFDSLWDOLVWZRUNSODFHWR
each moment of their day (Thompson, 1967; Clark, 1985; Adam, 1990; Hassard, 
1990). The flow of work-time and the strict structuring of clock-time often do not 
neatly align, and we have seen that our respondents recognise that this is often a 
highly artificial process. For instance, difficulties arise when recording time 
involved in engaging in multiple tasks, transitioning between tasks, or engaging 
in non-client related activities (cf. Anderson-Gough et al, 2001). The importance 
associated with clock-time means that the tax consultants have to put significant 
work into ensuring that every minute at work can relate to specific projects.  
 
Through quantification of time into six-minute slots, the organization is also able 
to directly value an HPSOR\HH¶VWLPH%\GRLQJWKLVLWEHFRPHVSRVVLEOHWRPDNH
a direct link between the time spent working on a particular issue and what is 
charged to a particular client. Moreover, it becomes possible to assign value to 
some kinds of activities and not to others (Anderson-Gough et al, 2001). In 
particular, work which can be reported as billable hours is considered valuable, 
while activities that cannot be clearly tied to billable hours are not valued by the 
firm. This valuation seemed to work in two ways. Firstly, it works through creating 
monetary value, as efforts are directed towards client activities. A strict link to 
short term firm profitability is the result. Activities like internal projects or 
competence development outside client relations are not encouraged. The 
second way it works is through the construction of moral value. In particular, it 
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FRQVWUXFWV DQ LPDJH RI ZKDW D µJRRG HPSOR\HH¶ LV FI$QGHUVRQ-Gough et al, 
2000). Indeed, WKHWHFKQRORJ\RIµELOODEOHKRXUV¶FROODSVHGWKHVHWZRDVSHFWVLQWR
one another. One palpable example of this was the public display and an on-
going discussion between juniors of billable hours.  
 
A related effect of this process of quantification and valuation is that employees 
begin to discipline themselves in order to ensure that their work time maximises 
their billable hours (cf. Brown & Lewis, 2011). The strict focus on working 
appeared to be the result of employees internalizing the notion of billable hours 
and carefully accounting for all their own time in relation to this. They begin to 
ensure that each hour could be attached to a specific project. The result is that 
their experience and orientation to time becomes ordered and disciplined. They 
begin WR VWDUW µWKLQNLQJ LQ VL[PLQXWH LQWHUYDOV¶7KLVPHDQV WKDWHPSOR\HHVDUH
constantly forced to make judgements about what is valuable work by using the 
sole criterion of whether it might be charged to a client or not. The result is that all 
tasks that are not billable (or potentially billable) tend to be considered to have no 
value. Other studies of accountants have found similar patterns. For instance, a 
study of trainee auditors' orientation to time found that initially young auditors 
ZRXOGVHHµDYDLODEOHWLPH¶LHWLPHZKHQWKH\ZHUHQRWVSHFLILFDOO\DVVLJQHGWRD
task) as a benefit (Coffey, 1994). However, the young auditors quickly realised 
that this non-chargeable time is something that should be avoided. The result is 
that they actively sought to be, or at least look, busy. In DM&I, looking busy 
PHDQVEHLQJDEOHWRFKDUJHRQH¶VKRXUVRXW 
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4.2 Investing in the Future 
,Q36)VPDNLQJDFDUHHULVRIWHQDPDLQREMHFWLYHIRUHPSOR\HHVµ3HRSOHGRQRW
join professional firms for jobs, but for careers¶Maister, 1993: 6). This is also the 
case for consultants at DM&I. An HR-SHUVRQFODLPHGWKDWµFOLPELQJWKHFRUSRUDWH
ODGGHULVZKDWWKH\PHDQE\SHUVRQDOGHYHORSPHQW¶3DUWQHUVDUHLQWKLVUHJDUG
important role models in that they display what is expected in terms of career: 
 
,QWKHZD\RIORRNLQJDWZRUNDV\RXFRXOGVD\WKHZRUN¶VSDUWRI\RXUOLIH
They have been career-IRFXVHG ,W¶VDOOZRUN IRU WKHP7KHQ\RXKDYHD
family on the side that the wife cares for. 
 
This Consultant goes on to note that she and her generation will demand a better 
work/life-balance, since many have spouses that also have career-oriented jobs. 
Still, the up-or-out system clearly promotes advancement and careers, and, as 
noted by the HR-person mentioned above, people will not be content staying at 
lower levels forever; progression is the norm. Challenges and progression keep 
the tax consultants motivated (at least as they phrase it), and DM&I is generally 
considered to be an environment that facilitates development. Moreover, the 
career is not something that gets taken care of by anyone else or by bureaucratic 
systems. It is all up to the individual. The individual is understood as being in 
charge, and among partners it can even be seen as a career disadvantage to not 
take individualism seriously. Requiring too much assistance is a sign that you 
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KDYHQRWTXLWHXQGHUVWRRGWKHUXOHVRIWKHJDPHµ,W¶VDOODGKRF¶D0DQDJHUVDLG
DQGFRQWLQXHGµ,W¶V\RX\RXUVHOIZKRKDYHWRPDNHVXUH\RXJHWWRGRZKDW\RX
want to do, no-one else ZLOOGRLWIRU\RX¶2QH0DQDJHUWROGXVWKDW\RXµKDYHWR
view it in a long-term perspective. The reward will come, but it will not come in 
WKLVPRQWK¶V WLPH-UHSRUW¶$V WKLV0DQDJHUVHHVWKLQJVZRUNLQJKDUGDW'0	, LV
an investment that will pay off in the future. Some are, however, not sure whether 
WKHLQYHVWPHQWZLOOSD\RII2QH&RQVXOWDQWQRWHGWKDWEHFRPLQJDSDUWQHUµLVDOO
about making money for the firm. And maybe my drive is not strong enough to 
SURJUHVVYHU\IDVW:H¶OOVHH¶)RUVRPHSUDFWLFDl circumstances make the career 
an all too insecure investment. One employee noted: 
 
:H DOUHDG\ KDYH IRXU SDUWQHUV KHUH LQ >WKLV FLW\@ DQG WKDW¶V WRR PDQ\
already. So someone has to quit, and how old are they? The oldest is 51, 
52. And they quit at 60. AnGWKHUHVWWKH\¶UHQRWHYHQWKHUHVWRIWKHP
6REHIRUHWKH\DSSRLQWDQ\QHZSDUWQHUV>KHUH@LW¶VDOLIHWLPH>/DXJKV@,W¶V
not something to strive for, I think. At least not for me. 
 
Thus, the value of the future investment varies between different individuals, but 
the idea that an amount of effort now will (or will not) pay off is an important way 
of relating to work.  
 
2QHUHDVRQWKHWD[DGYLVRUVµERXJKWLQWR¶WKHSUDFWLFHRIELOODEOHKRXUVZDVWKH\
saw it as a necessary way of investing in their careers. The reasons given for this 
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includes personal development (becoming a better person), professional 
development (becoming better at the job), building status (getting respect in the 
firm and wider society), and economic reasons (getting the big payoff associated 
ZLWK SDUWQHUVKLS 7KLV RULHQWDWLRQ WR LQYHVW LQ RQH¶V FDUHHU LV FHUWDLQO\
encouraged by particular technologies such as the up-or-out system. Moreover, 
the career becomes the responsibility for an individual to shape and build ± not 
something that the organization automatically gives them (Hanlon, 1994). In 
other words, the career becomes an important disciplinary mechanism that 
employees actually buy in and begin to see as the royal road to self-development 
(Grey, 1994; Anderson-Gough et al, 2001). But the way they invest in this most 
precious of commodities is through the accumulation of billable hours. By 
accumulating billable hours, the employees are able to clearly show they are 
adding value to the firm. We also noted that most employees recognise that like 
any investment, there is a certain risk involved. This might be due to the period of 
pay-off being too long (e.g. due to older partners blocking their career 
SURJUHVVLRQRUGXHWRWKHXQFHUWDLQW\DURXQGZKHWKHUDQHPSOR\HHZLOOµPDNHLW¶
in the up or out system. This meant that for many of our respondents, a career 
was something that they had to speculate in ± they must stake their time and 
VLJQLILFDQWHIIRUWDJDLQVWWKHULVN\IXWXUHRXWFRPHRIµPDNLQJSDUWQHU¶ 
 
4.3 Quantifying Soft Skills 
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As with most companies of its kind, DM&I have developed a formal rhetoric 
emphasising human resource management. This is apparent in publications such 
as the annual report: 
 
We aim to be the dominant consulting company on the Swedish market 
when it comes to tax advice. In order to fulfil this aim we must provide our 
client companies service of the highest quality. Our ability to provide such 
service is depending on the collective competence and effort of our 
HPSOR\HHV>«@ 
 
Thus, developing its workforce is seen as an important target for DM&I. This is 
also apparent in interviews, especially with senior partners, where there is a 
general agreement on the importance of developing the employees. This also 
UHJDUGV µVRIW¶ DVSHFWV ZKHUH D SHUIRUPDQFH HYDOXation system has been 
developed. It consists of several dimensions (including those mentioned in the 
annual report). The list of dimensions is divided into two columns (see Table 2). 
7KHLGHDLVWKDWµ&RQVXOWDQF\HYDOXDWLRQIDFWRUV¶DUHVXSSRVHGWRUHSUHVHnt how 
WKH µ&RPSHWHQFH FULWHULD¶ DUH UHDOL]HG LQ UHODWLRQ WR FOLHQWV (DFK GLPHQVLRQ LV
supposed to be peer-reviewed and superior-reviewed twice a year (although in 
practice, once a year seems to be the norm). Some consider the performance 
reviews helpful, in the sense that they provide feedback, while most see them as 
merely an administrative ritual.  
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TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
One problePLVKRZWKHµVRIW¶YDOXHVDUHVXSSRVHGWREHZHLJKWHGDJDLQVWµKDUG¶
ELOODEOH WLPH )RU LQVWDQFH RQH RI WKH µVRIW¶ DVSHFWV µFRQWULEXWLQJ WR EXVLQHVV
SURILWDELOLW\¶UHJDUGVEHLQJDµUDLQPDNHU¶LHEHLQJDEOHWRSURYLGHZRUNWRRWKHUV
But when given the choice between putting billable hours on your own time report 
and handing the task to someone else, the former is perceived as the safer 
choice. Even more so when it comes to non-quantitative aspects such as helping 
and supporting others or spending time developing internal organizational issues, 
as a Consultant explains: 
 
<RXJDLQQRWKLQJE\EHLQJKXPEOHRUVSHQGLQJWLPHRQWKLQJVWKDWFDQ¶WEH
billed. If you can push those things away, get someone else to do it, spend 
WLPHRQDWOHDVWORRNLQJOLNH\RX¶UHSXOOLQJLQPRQH\WKHQ«$QGWKLVPDNHV
those on their way, those climbing the ladder, not always behave as you 
FRXOGSHUKDSVZLVK« 
 
$QRWKHU FODLPHG WKDW µWKLV LV WKHKHDGTXDUWHUV RI HJRLVWLFEHKDYLRXU¶ ,W LV TXLWH
FOHDUWKDWWKHJHQHUDOYLHZLVWKDWµKDUG¶YDOXHVLHELOODEOHKRXUVDUHYLHZHGDV
more important.  
 
Despite the dominance of 'hard' measures of billable hours, there are some 
attempts to upgrade the importance of 'soft' values. For instance, one partner has 
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developed a system for more precLVHPHDVXUHPHQWRIµVRIW¶YDOXHV7KLVOHQJWK\
interview excerpt illustrates the line of reasoning and the difficulties encountered. 
During the interview, the partner illustrated the spider web diagrams he used on a 
piece of paper by drawing a diagram with several dimensions such as business 
acumen, team building, and social competence (interviewer in italics): 
 
± All these components are there, and then you can, as I have done, draw 
a circle with, what can it be, five or six arrows like this, where is says 
busiQHVVDFXPHQ« >GUDZLQJ RQ SDSHU@ You must have a five here, then 
yRX¶UH D 3DUWQHU D IRXU DQG \RX¶re D 0DQDJHU WKUHH DQG \RX¶UH D
&RQVXOWDQWWZRDQG\RX¶UHDQ$VVLVWDQW« 
± $QG DW RQH \RX¶YH TXLW« >$Q DWWHPSW DW LURQ\ WKDW GRHVQ¶W TXLWH KLW LWV
mark] 
± $QGDWRQH\RX¶YHTXLW:KHQ\RXORRNDWDSHUVRQ\RXORRNDWEXVLQHVV
acumen, look at social competence, look at material competence, and so 
on, and \RXPDUNWKHVHZLWKGRWV\RX¶OOJHWDSURILOHWKHUH« 
± 6SLGHUZHE« 
± Exactly. And then you see that you made it on these [points with pencil], 
but your business acumen is crap, because you never send out bills, you 
QHYHU GHELW \RXU FOLHQWV DQG VR RQ <RX¶OO QHYHU PDNH SDUWQHU LI \RX
FRQWLQXH OLNH WKLV2U \RX¶UH VORSS\ JHQHUDOO\«<RX¶UH JRRG DW DWWUDFWLQJ 
QHZ FOLHQWV \RX¶UH JRRG DW WHDP EXLOGLQJ DQG \RX¶UH JRRG DW PD\EH
OHDGHUVKLSEXW\RX\RX¶YHJRW WRPDNHWKLVZRUNILQDQFLDOO\WRR$QGWKHQ
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\RX FDQ VHH \RX FDQ VHW D WDUJHW IRU WKH QH[W \HDU LI \RX¶UH JRLQJ WR
EHFRPHD0DQDJHUWKHQ\RX¶OOKDYHWRPove your positions forward, from 
WZRWRIRXUULJKWWZRWRILYH2WKHUZLVH\RX¶UHGRQHIRU%HFDXVHLI\RXDVN
WKH TXHVWLRQ µ+RZ FRPH ,¶P QRW 0DQDJHU"¶ µ1R EHFDXVH \RX UHPDLQ
>NQRFNVRQGLDJUDP@WKHUH¶ 
>«@ 
± So how do you get these figures? 
± Well, the ILJXUHV\RXKDYHWRGRZLWK«,W¶VQRWWKDWHDV\WRPHDVXUHEXW
,KDYH« 
± /HW¶VVD\EXVLQHVVDFXPHQ" 
± But there is a lot of ingredients to that! [Self-confidently] Behind business 
acumen there may be like ten different headings. 
± But then you get uncertainty in those values? 
± :HOOLW¶VQRWSRVVLEOHWR«:LWKDEVROXWHFHUWDLQW\« 
± %XWWKDW¶VZKDW,PHDQLW« 
± The best would be if you could enter exactly, you can see that, ok, you 
KDYH«HLJKWZHHNVRXWRIWHQ\RXKDYHKDQGHGLQ\RXWLPHUHSRUWWRRODWH
$QGWKHQ,VD\\RX¶UHJRLQJWRJHWDRQHRQWKDW<RXVKRXOGWHQWLPHVRXW
of ten must be in time. I mean, RIFRXUVHLW¶VSRVVLEOHWRPHDVXUHLWH[DFWO\
HYHQWXDOO\ EXW ZH¶UH QRW WKHUH \HW EXW LW ZLOO PRYH WRZDUGV JUHDWHU
objectivity, towards creating demands for the employee and saying like 
WKLV µ7KLV GRHVQ¶W ZRUN¶ %XW LW¶V KDUG $QG ZH¶UH DW WKH EHJLQQLQJ of a 
process that will take like five to ten years before it has settled. This is a 
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YHU\FRPSOH[DUHDLW¶VDOVRKDUGWRJHWPHDVXUDEOHILJXUHVLQDQDGHTXDWH
way, and it will take some time, but it will pay off in the end.  
 
These attempts at quantifying WKHµVRIW¶DVSHFWVRIWKHSHUIRUPDQFHUHYLHZVPXVW
be understood in relation to the strong focus on billable hours at DM&I. While the 
conversation clearly indicates that there are difficulties in creating clear-cut 
measures, the partner insists on its feasibility.! In terms of financialization, the 
SDUWQHUFUHDWHVDGLUHFW OLQNEHWZHHQµVRIW¶DVSHFWVRISHUIRUPDQFHDQGILQDQFLDO
reward. Moving up from one level to another, e.g. from Consultant to Manager, 
automatically means an increase in pay and also a higher billing fee. Thus, an 
LQFUHDVHLQµEXVLQHVVDFXPHQ¶DQGRWKHUDVSHFWVZRXOGUHQGHUDKLJKHUOHYHUDJH
on billable hours. The logic underpinning the quantification effort is one where 
µVRIW¶DVSHFWVRIZRUNDUHWUDQVIRUPHGLQWRWKHFXUUHQF\RIELOODEOHKours. 
 
Of course, not all partners agree in the possibility of actually measuring 
performance in these aspects. Still, however, there is a belief in the fairness of 
progression when it comes to investing in soft aspects. 
 
(UZHOOZHFDQ¶WEHPDWKHPDWLFDOly precise about it, there is no machine 
WKDWFDQVSLWRXWDSDSHUDQGVD\WKDWLW¶VWKUHHSRLQWVHYHQWKLVPRQWK,W
has to rely on judgement for measurement. [...] We know if John is a lone 
wolf sitting in his office all day and we know that Lisa is a happy soul who 
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always have three co-ZRUNHUVRQKHUPLVVLRQV ,W¶V«SUHWW\HDV\ WRVHH
(YHQLILW¶VKDUGWRPHDVXUHE\WKHPLOOLPHWUH 
 
Formally, these judgements are supposed to be evaluated and quantified. Even if 
everyone is not as confident as the spider web-drawing partner above, in the 
SHHU UHYLHZ SURFHVV D IDFW VKHHW DERXW HDFK LQGLYLGXDO¶V SHUIRUPDQFH LV
supposed to be produced, where each performance indicator is graded in five 
VWHSV UDQJLQJ IURP µSRRU¶ WR µH[FHSWLRQDO¶ ,Q WKLV V\VWHP WKH GHJUHH Rf 
correspondence between quantified performance is more ambiguous, as each 
indicator is supposed to have µEHHQVHHQLQUHODWLRQWRFDUHHUGHYHORSPHQW¶DQG
WKHPDQXDODOVRQRWHVWKDWWKHLQGLFDWRUVKDYHµYDU\LQJGHJUHHVRILPSRUWDQFHLQ
different phases of WKHFDUHHU¶ 
 
 
Although there is a range of different performance measures at work within the 
firm, they are not all valued in the same way. Despite significant lip-service being 
SDLG WR WKH µVRIW¶ GLPHQVLRQVRI WKH SHUIRUPDQFH FULWHULD WKH µKDUGHU¶ HFRQRmic 
dimensions of the performance reviews were clearly more important. Despite 
attempts to upgrade the importance of soft measures, managers within the firm 
acknowledged that these dimensions are very difficult to measure. In contrast the 
µKDUGHU¶GLPHQVLRns such as billable hours are easily measured. The result is that 
employees tend to focus on these measures. Indeed, directly quantifiable 
outcomes that are closely tied to firm profitability are the major focus of most 
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HPSOR\HHV¶ HIIRUWV7KLV LV E\ QRPHans unusual to PSFs. A recent study of a 
PDQXIDFWXULQJ FRPSDQ\ IRXQG WKH SUHSRQGHUDQFH RIPRUH µGHVSRWLF¶PRGHV RI
FRQWURO WKDW LPSRVHGDVVHVVPHQWVRQ WKHEDVLVRIGLUHFWFRQWULEXWLRQ WRD ILUP¶V
financial performance (Ezzamel et al, 2008). Through linking these hard forms¶ 
PHDVXUHVVXFKDVFRQWULEXWLRQWRSURILWDELOLW\WRHDFKLQGLYLGXDO¶VEHKDYLRXUWKH
ILUPZDVDEOHWRSXVKWKHµGLVFLSOLQHRIWKHILQDQFLDOPDUNHWV¶GRZQWRWKHOHYHORI
the workplace. But what is more surprising for us is that employees do not just 
experience this as a form of despotic discipline (as Ezzamel et al, 2008 suggest), 
but rather as an investment in their own future which may pay significant 
dividends in the future.  
 
4.4 Putting a price on performance 
 
It is quite clear that the billable time is the dominating indicator of performance. 
As mentioned in section 4.1 above, several difficulties appear when trying to 
YDOXH RQH¶V WLPH LQ WHUPV RI ELOODEOH KRXUV7KHVHGLIILFXOWLHV DUH KRZHYHU RQO\
one aspect to the problems of accumulating billable hours. Another regards the 
fact that the hours billed on a particular job are the result of a negotiation 
between (usually) a superior and a subordinate. The common way of organizing 
work is that a senior person manages the client relation (cf. Alvehus, 2008). Work 
tasks are either solved by the senior or handed to a more junior employee. 
Before handing a solution over to the client, the senior employee reviews the job. 
If s/he does the job her/himself, it is supposed to be reviewed by a peer (although 
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this only happens when the task is considered very difficult). The hours billed are 
WKHQ VKDUHG EHWZHHQ ERWK FRQVXOWDQWV ,Q WKLV SURFHVV RI µVKDULQJ¶ HPSOR\HHV
HQJDJH LQ D SURFHVVRI µJDPHSOD\LQJ¶ZKHUHE\ELOODEOH KRXUVDUHPDQLSXODWHG
and changed. A Consultant spells this out quite clearly: 
 
If you notice that you have to put in some more time, then the problem is 
that you may have to seek assistance for either controlling your work or get 
support from a Manager. And they are really expensive. And then you start 
worrying about which parts of the work you want him to see in order to 
avoid him from taking over the job entirely and start spending so much time 
on it that there's nothing left for you. Or you can, if you have the 
opportunity, hand it down to someone really cheap, someone who debits 
as little as possible, and try to squeeze this person. Take me for instance, I 
bill 1600 kronor [SEK] per hour, and we have a Manager, he bills let's say 
2000 kronor. And you have a new Assistant who bills 900 kronor per hour. 
And you know that this job is worth 10 000 at a maximum. If you're going to 
do it yourself you quickly figure out that six hours, then you're at 9000 
kronor, and a thousand for peer review, that doesn't work. 'Six hours, shit, I 
can't do this in six hours.' Then you ask, maybe, let's say Eve, and you say 
'Hell, why don't you do this job Eve, you get four hours maximum, not more 
then four, maybe five.' You know what I'm getting at? You force her to do a 
job you should have done yourself, could have done, but in order to keep 
within the price, to avoid over-billing or not being able to get the client to 
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pay, for instance, or in order to get some more time for yourself you 
squeeze someone else, push it down to some Assistant who can do it 
cheaper. And you can keep the margin for yourself, maybe review what 
she has done, and go below the 10 000. So you can bill 10 000 without 
having to go to a Manager. Or you spend a little time on it and when you 
come to the manager it's just for him to read through, 'yes it's ok,' it's a 
cheap way of dealing with it. This becomes a necessity because of the 
system itself.  
 
Here, many aspects of the billing game are made clear. First, it's worth noting 
that the person with the client relation not only has to relate to subordinates but 
also to superiors. The amount of time available for reviewing has to be taken into 
account. Second, it's worth noting that what cannot be billed to the client is 
pushed downwards in the organization (since subordinates are cheaper). If it's 
impossible to do a job yourself in six hours, it's perhaps possible to 'squeeze' 
someone else into doing it in four or five hours. And the more subordinates you 
have access to, the easier this becomes. If others do the job and you do the 
review, leverage can be achieved for the individual. In this way, it is possible to 
avoid non-billable hours, and one's time can be spent on more rewarding jobs. 
This effectively puts an end to the idea that junior employees report the number 
of hours they actually work. 
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At the same time, it is common to keep profitable jobs (where the client's 
willingness to pay is higher) for oneself. Also, sometimes the review process is 
seen as too encumbering and it is more efficient to do the job oneself rather than 
to delegate and review (the so-called 'under-delegation problem'; Maister, 1993), 
which in turn makes experience transfer and learning more difficult. And, as 
QRWHGDERYHUHJLVWHULQJKRXUVWRRQH¶VRZQWLPHUHSRUWLVFRQVLGHUHGDVDIHZD\
of getting credit for one's work. As one partner said, 'the more time you can bill 
yourself, the more money in your wallet.' 
 
This situation from a certain perspective looks rather diabolic. For the junior 
employee, however, there are quite instrumental reasons for engaging in this 
system. From the view of someone on the receiving end (Eve in the above 
quotation), there are basically three options: to bill the number of hours spent on 
a job, to under-bill or to over-bill. The latter option is attractive since it 
immediately impacts on billable time, and thereby facilitates progression.  The 
possibility to over-bill is highly related to the kind of clients and jobs one works 
with. 
 
The first time you do something it takes much more time. But if you just 
handled a question for another client you can perhaps copy the letter you 
wrote, and then I can bill some extra time that day, and that makes me 
happy. 
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Over-billing is a lot less common than the opposite, but still it remains an option 
for some. More commonly, the question is whether to bill the number of hours 
worked or whether to under-ELOOµ,W¶VDTXHVWLRQRIPDUNHWLQJ¶DVDQ$VVLVWDQWSXW
it. To get more assignments from a specific superior it is important to look 
efficient, the Assistant explains, and to keep the number of billable hours down. 
And this is of course taken advantage of: 
 
,IVRPHRQHFDOOV\RXDQGKH¶VJRLQJWRJHWRQKLVUHSRUWKRZPXFK
\RXELOODQGKH¶VJRLQJ WRELOO WKHFOLHQWDQG LIKHFDOOVPH LW FRVWV
25 000 and if he calls Charlie it will cost >@,PHDQ«>«@$QG
of course they take advantage of this. 
As a junior, you compete on an internal market for assignments, with your peers 
as competitors. In order to sell your services, prices have to be kept low. As a 
junior, you still have no definite expertise, and thereby it is hard to gain a 
competitive advantage by specialization. Price competition is the only option. In 
order to gain repeat business, and thereby secure your future billing rate, under-
billing becomes a rational solution. Thus, while in the quotation from the 
Consultant above the limitation in billing was enforced, there is a willingness from 
junior employees to engage in this behaviour.  
 
Building up billable hours was seen as an investment. However, simply 
accumulating hours was not the only strategy available to employees. There was 
a range of other ways they could seek to build a stock of billable hours. This 
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often involved a process of arbitrage, i.e. exploiting possible imbalances in 
various internal markets within the firm. This was facilitated by the fact that there 
is a highly ambiguous relationship between time actually worked and time that is 
billed to a client. This ambiguity provided significant room for manoeuvre in the 
assignment of particular billable hours to particular tasks and particular people. 
This ambiguity allowed the exploitation of imbalances in the types of people 
doing the work (particularly between highly paid seniors and less well paid 
juniors). Typically this involves a senior (or partner) using the services of a junior 
ZLWKDFKHDSHUELOOLQJUDWHWRGRWKHZRUN7KH\ZRXOGWKHQµVKDUH¶VRPHRIWKH
hours with the junior under the pretence of supervisory time. This often involves 
processes of intricate accounting whereby employees will consider the value of 
the job, whether their charge out rate will allow them to complete it in time, and if 
not, whether it can be shifted to a more junior employee (with some advantages 
UHQGHUHGWRWKHHPSOR\HHWKHPVHOYHV7KLVLVZKDWZHFDOOµWKHELOOLQJJDPH¶± a 
frequent process whereby seniors seek to exploit the relatively cheaper billable 
hours of juniors within the firm, and in the process take a cut themselves.  
 
$QRWKHUGLPHQVLRQ WR WKLV µELOOLQJJDPH¶ LV WKDW VHQLRUV VHHN WRDYRLGGRLQJ WKH
difficult tasks (tasks which will often take longer than what they can bill for ± often 
due to price sensitive clients) and monopolise what they see as easy jobs (tasks 
which will taken a shorter amount of time than what they can bill ± often due to 
large, price insensitive clients). Because juniors have a lower charge out rate, 
DQGDUHDEOHWREHµVTXHH]HG¶LHUHQGHUQRQ-billable time after-hours) this sets 
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up an imbalance which wily seniors are only too willing to exploit. Juniors are 
often only too willing to acquiesce in being exploited in such a way. One reason 
for this is that working overtime is a symbol for commitment to the organization 
(Coffey, 1994); something they hope might later be picked up in their 
performance reviews. A second reason is that juniors are completely reliant on 
their seniors for a stream of work. If a junior is seen as being compliant and 
helpful then their stream of (lower paid) work is likely to expand, subsequently 
PHDQLQJWKH\DUHDEOHWRH[SDQGWKHLUµLQYHVWPHQW¶LQELOODEOHKRXUVPRUHUDpidly. 
However, if a junior is reluctant to take on difficult jobs and work overtime, then it 
is likely that they will be seen as non-compliant by seniors and their stream of 
work might begin to dry up. The result ± VSHQGLQJWRRPXFKWLPHµRQWKHEHDFK¶
(i.e. between projects and without any billable time) ± could be the kiss of death 
in any PSF (cf. Evans et al, 2004).  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
  
In this paper we have examined how employees are controlled in a PSF. We 
found many of the control mechanisms in place one would expect in a PSF, such 
as professional knowledge bases (Abbott, 1991), human resource management 
systems (Maister, 1993), management by objectives (Covaleski et al, 1998), up-
or-out systems (Baden-Fuller & Bateson, 1990), and forms of identity control 
(Alvesson, 2004). However, what seems to tie each of these systems together is 
an over-arching concern with investment in work. We have noted this involves 
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the flow of work-time being quantified and valued through the technology of 
billable hours (see also: Brown & Lewis, 2011). These billable hours are carefully 
invested in by employees in the expectation that they might later convert them 
into career advancement (in particular a partnership). Finally, this opens up 
space for arbitrage whereby employees can convert other forms of currency 
(such as good performance evaluations) into billable hours or exploit differential 
rates for billable hours between seniors and juniors within the firm.  
 
What is particularly interesting here is how this QRWLRQRIµLQYHVWPHQW¶ZDVOLQNHG
to one specific form of control, financialization, within the organization (e.g. 
Davis, 2009). According to existing studies, this process involves an attempt to 
infuse the logic of investment and shareholder value into all business decisions 
and aspects of organizational life (Ezzamel et al, 2008). It is interesting to note 
the importance of the ideological aspect of financialization in the DM&I context, 
as the firm is not publicly traded. Thus, pressure from investors to emphasise 
financialized control forms is not apparent. Rather, Partners embracing it as part 
RI µKRZ WKH EXVLQHVV ZRUNV¶ ,W LV DOVR DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WKH LQFUHDVLQJ VKLIW LQ
accountancy firms away from a logic of civic-professionalism towards a more 
hard-nosed market-oriented logic (Hanlon, 1994, Leicht & Fennell, 2001; 
Suddaby et al, 2009). In our study of DM&I, we found that the auditors did indeed 
extensively use a financialized language and logic for talking about and thinking 
of their work. This was based on fairly minimal instructions that have been a 
stable feature of the firm that require auditors to report their own time and 
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allocate it to specific projects/clients. Thus the official version is that the number 
of worked hours should be reported in a straight-forward and accurate fashion. 
The manipulation of the system, which we term financialization, is based on an 
understanding of the system as something that can and should be manipulated 
DQG µZRUNHG¶ LQ RUGHU WR SURPRWH RQHVHOI ZLWKLQ WKH ILUP:H have seen that 
strategies for this vary, especially between junior and senior employees. However 
it is important to note that these understandings are displayed in interpersonal 
relations, and they do turn into a form of instruction. The demand to creatively 
PDQLSXODWHRQH¶VELOODEOHKRXUV LVDNLQGRIVNLOO WKDW LVZLGHO\NQRZQ UHZDUGHG
and informally taught, but not officially sanctioned. Indeed, it could be seen as a 
FHUWDLQNLQGRIµJDPHSOD\LQJ¶0F*LYHUQ& Ferlie, 2007) that allows people to not 
just get the job done but also progress in their career.  
 
Of further importance is how financialization relates to the notion of time 
employed in the use of billable hours. Billable hours can be seen as an allocation 
of time (Hassard, 1989) according to µFORFN WLPH¶ $QFRQD HW DO $V WKH
system is designed, there is supposedly a linear relation between time and 
activity. The actors do, however, engage in several forms of manipulation of the 
system. While time can be seen as either representing the unfolding of events or 
as something experienced differently by different actors (Ancona et al, 2001; 
Perlow, 1999), financialization creates a notion of time that is only vaguely 
related to either the clock or to the experience of time. The relation between 
DFWXDO WLPH VSHQW RQ DFWLYLWLHV DQG µILQDQFLDOL]HG WLPH¶ LV DV ZH KDYH VKRZQ
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above, quite loose. The billing game is somewhat dependent on the actual time a 
task takes to perform, but other considerations as well. Billing rates make time 
relative to cerWDLQDFWRUVDVVRPHLQGLYLGXDOV¶WLPHLVPRUHYDOXDEOHWKDQRWKHUV¶
7KLV IXUWKHU ORRVHQV WKH OLQN EHWZHHQ µFORFN WLPH¶ DQG µILQDQFLDOL]HG WLPH¶ 7KH
latter transforms time into a currency that is comparable with other aspects of 
everyday work, such as the valuation of soft skills, and with other notions of time, 
such as investments in the future. 
 
As well as being a kind of game playing, the focus on billable hours was an 
important form of employee control because it facilitated a process of self-
monitoring and self-management (Morris & Pinnington, 1998; Brown & Lewis, 
2011). In the simplest terms, it focuses employees on work by ensuring that all 
six-minute slots of the day are accounted for. But it also links a sense of an 
HPSOR\HH¶V ZRUWK WR WKH ILUP E\ directly quantifiable and measurable hours. 
Finally, it places the accumulation of this worth in direct relationship with 
developing a career within the firm. It does this by pushing the employee to not 
only ensure that they are accumulating the most billable hours possible, but also 
that they reflect and think about how it might be possible to accumulate ever-
more of this precious commodity. This contrasts with more traditional images of 
professionals as being more concerned with tasks and knowledge than time per 
se (Blyton et al, 1989). 
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(DFK RI WKHVH SURFHVVHV PHDQV WKDW WKLQNLQJ DERXW RQH¶V ZRUN DV D NLQG RI
investment became central. Questions about what one should and should not do 
within the workplace became increasingly governed by the test of whether it 
ZRXOGLQFUHDVHRQH¶VVWRFNRIFDSLWDO7KHUHVXOWZDVWKDWHDFKHPSOR\HHFDPH
to think of themselves as financial investors and their work as a kind of 
investment. Working did not just mean executing tasks ± it also meant 
investment, speculating and engaging in arbitrage with one's time. What is more, 
notions of investment continued to inform and discipline the working days and 
identities of each employee. Thus financialization was a central way that work 
was controlled in this particular setting.  
 
Viewed from a managerial perspective, there are several reasons for developing 
and enforcing these systems. The increased emphasis on time measurement is a 
way of establishing a more precise control over how time is spent. Each 
individual becomes accountablHIRUKLVRUKHUFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHILUP¶VSURILWDELOLW\
and this is all put in an easily manipulated and aggregated form. When firm value 
is reduced to simplistic financial measures, this creates a link between individual 
performance and firm value and reputation (Faulconbridge & Muzio, 2009). It 
also gives a clear track record of the historical performance of each individual, 
helping in deciding on promotions. The HRM system is partly a way of marketing 
the firm on the important input market (i.e. competing for top students to recruit). 
It is also a way of defining which behaviour and dispositions the firm wants to 
promote, it created an evaluation grid to which everyone is supposed to conform 
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(Townley, 1993). All in all, these systems can be construed as a way of 
HVWDEOLVKLQJ D PRUH SUHFLVH FRQWURO RYHU WKH ILUP¶V UHVRXUFHV WLPH DQG WKH
employees. This is also the way the situation is perceived by the senior partners 
in the firm. As was often noted at DM&I, all questions in the firm ultimately turn 
into ZKDW WKH\ FDOOHG µZDOOHW TXHVWLRQV¶ ZKHWKHU WKH SDUWQHUV EHQHILW IURP LW
financially). 
 
By pointing out the role financialization plays in control of the workplace, we have 
extended existing research on financialization as a control strategy at the firm 
(Fligstein, 1990; Froud et al, 2000; Ezzamel et al, 2008; Faulconbridge & Muzio, 
2009), market (Arrighi, 1994), and societal level (Martin, 2002; Davis, 2009). In 
particular we have suggested that financial techniques and processes of 
reasoning have come to infuse how employees think about their work, their 
careers, and indeed about themselves. We have noted that through emphasising 
ELOODEOHKRXUVHPSOR\HHV¶ZRUN-time became understood purely in terms of this 
quantifiable measure (see also Anderson-Gough et al, 2001). This leads to a kind 
of internalised discipline whereby employees seek to invest their time at the firm 
wisely. This involves seeking to accumulate as many billable hours as possible, 
as billable hours become the preferred way of displaying performance and 
progression. It also leads to a kind of speculative attitude on the part of 
employees, whereby they would seek to increase their stock of investments ± 
largely through the exploitation of junior colleagues. The result is that working life 
was experienced as one large market that should be skilfully negotiated in order 
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to reap the benefits. This suggests that not only have we seen the financialization 
of economy and firms; we have also seen the financialization of workplace 
control. 
 
6 Limitations and further research 
Our findings are limited in a number of ways. First our findings are limited in 
temporal scope. Our study only examines how financialization works in a recent 
setting. This means that it is difficult to trace in detail the historical trajectory of 
financialized control in this particular workplace. If we had examined this 
historical dimension in more detail, it would have become possible to identify 
when financialization became an important form of control in PSFs, whether 
forms of financialized controls are particularly novel or if they have important 
antecedents, and what were the conditions which drove the increasing 
importance of financialized control.1 By providing a historical and geographical 
account of financialization, it might become possible to provide a more detailed 
account of the underpinning drivers of financialized control in PSFs. 
 
A second major shortcoming is that we have focused on one kind of PSF (a Big 
Four accountancy). In many ways this is exactly the kind of the environment 
where one would expect to find employees using their training and expertise in 
financial and accounting technologies to think about their own work time. It is 
                                                 
1
   As one of the anonymous reviewers pointed out, these systems 
have been around for quite some time in Anglo-American firms. 
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possible to argue that the same may not be the case in PSFs which are less 
infused with financial technologies. On the other hand, we must note that the 
case discussed here is one where we would not necessarily expect pressures for 
financialization, as the shares of DM&I are not publicly traded and hence there is 
no external pressure for financialization. Rather, it seems that financialization has 
become part of how the business logic is perceived to operate, despite obvious 
counter-indicators (as actual revenues are only loosely coupled to hours worked). 
Would we find the same kind of financialization of workplace control in a legal 
office, in an architecture firm, or a design consultancy? What about outside the 
realm of professional services? Do we find the financialization of control in the 
manufacturing and service sectors? How about the public and non-profit sector? 
There is some evidence to suggest that the financialization of workplace control 
is not simply limited to the professional service workplace. For instance a number 
of writers have noted the increasing dominance of shareholder value within large 
corporations and the dominance of the work process by a range of technologies 
which are associated with ensure the increased in shareholder value (e.g. 
Ezzamel et al, 2008; Gleadle & Cornelieus, 2008; cf. Fiss & Zajac, 2004). This 
opens up the question of how generalised the financialization of workplace 
control has become?  
 
The third clear limitation is that we have only studied one particular institutional 
context ± namely an Anglo-American based Big Four accountancy in Sweden. 
Given the basis of this company largely within the Anglo-American institutions 
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associated with shareholder driven capitalism (Whitley, 1999; Hall & Soskice 
2001), it is not surprise that we find the financialization of workplace control. To 
be sure, the fact the auditors were working in Sweden may have had an 
important mediating effect ± in particular it would have added elements of co-
operative and welfare oriented capitalism (Belfrage, 2008; Esping-Anderson, 
1990). However, the Swedish context continues make a strong role for the 
financial market oriented forms of control ± particularly in more recent years 
(Blom, 2007). International studies of PSFs tend to indicate that Anglo-Saxon 
mores have some influence on how the firms organize work in a range of national 
contexts (Boussebaa, 2009). Many PSFs have served as important sites that 
have facilitated the travel of ideas and the creation of markets which have 
actually created global spaces that nonetheless bare important imprints of their 
national origins (e.g. Morgan & Quack, 2005). What remains to be seen is 
whether this same kind of financialization of work is limited to Anglo-Saxon 
dominated workplace or whether it can also be observed in workplaces that have 
QRWWUDGLWLRQDOO\EHHQGRPLQDWHGE\ µUHVWOHVV¶ ILQDQFLDOFDSLWDOVXFKDV*HUPDQ\
France and Japan. 
 
Fourth, there are notions of various labour markets that must be developed in 
more detail. As noted by Faulconbridge and Muzio (2009), increasing 
financialization seems to affect labour markets. Comparing the professionals at 
DM&I with itinerant experts working through temporal contracts, there are striking 
similarities in terms of the commodification of time and how activities become 
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targets for careful financial consideration (cf. Barley & Kunda, 2004; Evans et al, 
2004). For contractors, time between contracts becomes a commodity that can 
be invested in e.g. developing skills or in freedom from work. These 
considerations are, IRU WKH µRUGLQDU\¶ HPSOR\HH PDQDJHG WKURXJK WKH
employment contract. When a firm employs financialized forms of control, the 
investment considerations appear also within the employment contract. Investing 
in the future, considering the importance of different skills, negotiating and 
marketing oneself are important activities. To some degree, we find similar 
characteristics between internal and external labour markets (Doeringer, 1967). 
There are however differences that should be emphasised and investigated 
further. Where itinerant professionals have mainly horizontal career trajectories 
MRE VSHFLILF VHH %DUOH\ 	 .XQGD  WKH HPSOR\HG SURIHVVLRQDO¶V
financialization involves a vertical dimension. For some, this can mean a degree 
of security while for others it can become a difficulty (if career opportunities within 
the firm seem bleak). In the first case, a return to employment is an option 
(however often not desired; Barley & Kunda, ibid.). In the latter case, transitions 
between different employers may become an option. Thus, the horizontal and 
vertical dimensions can become blurred, and this should be a target for further 
qualitative studies. Moreover, the bureaucratic relationship within a firm requires 
more elaborate systems for e.g. translating between soft skills and the 
ILQDQFLDOL]HG µKDUG¶ FXUUHQF\ HJ ELOODEOH KRXUV ZKLOH WKH PDUNHWLQJ RI VNLOOV
mainly involves billable hours. For the itinerant professional the question of 
marketing is more open, e.g. involving presenting and delivering certain skills as 
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well as putting an hourly billing rate. While transactions are reduced to financial 
transactions within market relations, this also creates a different system for 
negotiating (in itself is an important skill for the itinerant professional). Thus, the 
experience of career investment is framed differently, and how this impacts 
subjectification through investing and tracing a career trajectory into the future 
(Grey, 1994) should be studied in more detail. 
 
The final question that is opened up by the global financial crisis is whether 
financial logic and technology may have lost some of its legitimacy. Some 
analyses have suggested that financialization led to an increasingly tenuous 
relationship between the actual productive output of the firm and its 
representation through the means of various accounting technologies (e.g. Froud 
et al, 2004). Others have suggested that the financial crises suggest that one of 
the central driving factors is financial and other business professionals giving up 
on any notions of public service and instead being solely driven by market-based 
criteria such as billable hours (Sikka, 2009). Still other commentators argue that 
the severe problems generated by complex financial technologies have led to a 
full-blown crisis in finance-dominated capitalism (e.g. Crouch, 2008). One of the 
results is that firms may abandon the kind of financial logic and technologies that 
produced many of these results. A second outcome may be that the power of 
financial capital over corporations will markedly decline, particularly with 
increasing state investments in some industries and even wholesale 
nationalization programmes. This could mean that firms no longer are called 
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upon to justify their operations in the language of financial returns, but use some 
as yet unidentified new scheme of justification. This remains to be seen, but it is 
certain that tracing the shifting power of finance and scope of financialization 
following the global financial crisis would certainly repay further study. 
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TABLES 
 
 
TABLE 1: Interviews in the study of DM&I 
 
  Phase of 
investigation 
 
Personell category 
 
Phase 1 
 
Phase 2 
 
Phase 3 
 
Total 
Partner 4 5 0 9 
Senior manager 0 1 2 3 
Manager 0 2 2 4 
Consultant 3 9 0 12 
Assistant 2 4 1 7 
Support staff 1 4 0 5 
Defectors 0 0 2 2 
Total 10 25 7 42 
!
 
 
 
TABLE 2: Performance indicators at DM&I 
 
 
Competence criteria Consultancy evaluation 
factors 
Technical competence Degree of autonomy 
Analysis/Judgement Ability to sell 
Initiative Client relations 
Work- and organizing ability 
Communication ability 
Contributing to 
business 
profitability 
Linguistic competence Problem solving ability 
Profit thinking 
Social competence 
Ability to finish jobs on 
time 
Leadership 
Ability to cooperate 
Ability to manage 
conflict and 
handle critique 
Business acumen  
(from the Personnel development 
handbook) 
 
